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University of Michigan
Mr. Nilson correctly points out the severe
limitations of Richardson’s model of inter-
national politics, which I have also at-
tempted to do in the article he discusses. I
feel, however, that certain important aspects
of Richardson’s position need to be clarified.
Richardson can no longer speak for himself,
and it may seem presumptuous for someone
else to do this for him. However, there is
considerable unanimity among all builders
of mathematical models in behavioral sci-
ence on what the values and the limitations
of such models are, and so in my reply I
shall be doing no more than reiterating a
position which has been stated many times
by many workers, including Richardson.
First, a mathematical model is not a met-
aphor but a logical scheme. Its conclusions
are not analogies drawn between apparent-
ly similar phenomena but deductions from
a set of postulates. If the conclusions are
manifestly false, so must the assumptions
be. If the conclusions are true, the assump-
tions are corroborated but not necessarily
proved to be true, because it may be pos-
sible to derive the conclusions from different
assumptions.
Therefore, any interpretation of Richard-
son’s model as a metaphorical analogue to a
mechanical system misreads the purpose of
the model, and this applies to all mathe-
matical models. The mathematical model
is strictly circumscribed. It asserts no more
than is explicitly stated, but also no less.
This usually turns out to be both more
and less than is apparent from a gross
observation of the phenomenon in ques-
tion. For example, to compare the busi-
ness cycle to the motions of a frictionless
pendulum in the mathematical sense is to
say both more and less than can be said
about either a pendulum or a business cycle
from gross observations. The mathematical
model says more, because it not only asserts
that the pendulum swings &dquo;back and forth&dquo;
but also describes its motion with mathe-
matical precision. But the mathematical
model also says less because it says nothing
about the &dquo;causes&dquo; of the motion, as &dquo;cause&dquo;
is conceived in the common-sense view
(e.g., whether the impulses come from &dquo;in-
side&dquo; or from &dquo;outside&dquo;), nothing about the
material from which the pendulum is made,
nothing about the use to which it is put,
etc.
The mathematical model subsumes under
a single mathematical description all phe-
nomena regardless of content which are de-
scribed by the same set of equations. The
pendulum model says only: &dquo;A quantity
changes in such a way as i f it were the hori-
zontal displacement from a position equilib-
rium of a mass point suspended by a rigid
rod; that is, as i its acceleration were pro-
portional (for small deviations) to the
amount of displacement and oppositely
directed.&dquo;
All quantities which change precisely in
this way (namely, sinusoidally) in time are
subsumed under the pendulum model. An-
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other way of stating it is this: 1 a displace-
ment is countered by a &dquo;force&dquo; (we must
use quotation marks because elsewhere such
&dquo;forces&dquo; may be purely symbolic) negative-
ly proportional to the displacement, then
the variation of the displacement in time
will be sinusoidal.
Returning to Richardson, all that his arms-
race model says is this: &dquo;1 f the rate of
change of armament expenditures is a linear
combination of three terms-one positively
proportional to the armament expenditures
of the rival, one negatively proportional to
one’s own armament expenditures, and one
embodying the ’strength of existing griev-
ances’-then the time course of the arma-
ment expenditures of the two rival states
should be such-and-such. Moreover, if cer-
tain inequalities obtain among the propor-
tionality coefficients, then the armament ex-
penditures will be stabilized; if the reverse
inequalities obtain, the expenditures will
either grow without bound or, on the con-
trary, will vanish and become ’negative’
(interpreted as excess of mutual trade over
armament expenditures). Which of these
two alternatives will obtain depends on the
levels of armaments and trade at the start
of the process.&dquo;
This, and only this, is what the model
says. A theory of anns races and trade
volumes can conceivably be built on these
foundations, if suitable, consistent indexes
can be found to denote armament expendi-
tures, trade volume, &dquo;amount of grievance,&dquo;
etc., provided sufficient data are on hand to
plot these quantities over considerable in-
tervals of time. The content of the theory
would be an interpretation of the indexes,
including, perhaps, an interpretation of &dquo;un-
bounded growth&dquo; of armaments. In Richard-
son’s theory &dquo;unbounded growth,&dquo; for ex-
ample, is interpreted as an outbreak of war.
The equations do not say this; it is an extra
assumption of the theory.
As far as I know, only one unequivocal
but exceedingly weak corroboration of Rich-
ardson’s model has been offered, namely,
the expenditures of the great powers in the
armament race of 1909-13. The corrobora-
tion was unequivocal, because the accuracy
of prediction of the model was very good;
it was very weak, because only four points
were obtained on the graph, two of which
served to fix the parameters.
The limitations of the theory based on the
model, therefore, are obvious. Data are
meager; the indexes are difficult to establish
(e.g., unequal purchase power of money
units, ambiguous budgets, etc.); the &dquo;dy-
namics&dquo; are complicated by imperfect polar-
ity of the rival camps; quantification of
&dquo;grievances&dquo; is all but impossible; etc. More-
over, there is an &dquo;embarrassment of riches&dquo;
with regard to the choice of models. Why,
for example, should the effects of mutual
stimulation, of self-imposed restraints, and
of grievances be additive? Why should they
not combine in some other way? The num-
ber of free parameters will enable the theo-
retician to fit practically any model to any
reasonably smooth curve of armament ex-
penditures. How is one to choose among
the various plausible models?
All these are legitimate objections to a
mathematical model and to a theory based
on it. But the objections offered by Mr.
Nilson are of a different sort. The objection
that the notion of &dquo;neutral equilibrium&dquo; is
as important as that of stable and unstable
equilibrium is not really relevant when of-
fered as an objection to Richardson’s mathe-
matical model. For &dquo;neutral equilibrium&dquo; is
a special case there: it obtains when a cer-
tain equality (instead of inequality) among
the parameters is satisfied.
Actually, Mr. Nilson’s objections are rele-
vant not to Richardson’s mathematical mod-
el at all but against Richardson’s conceptual
scheme. But that scheme is not the drawing
of metaphorical analogies with mechanical
systems (as Mr. Nilson seems to imply)
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but rather the method of treating events
related to international politics by systems
of linear differential equations, with the un-
derlying assumption of continuity, namely,
that minute changes in one variable produce
minute changes in another and that the ef-
fects of several variables can be considered
as simply additive.
The examples offered all pertain to this
criticism: Queen Anne’s decision to support
the one party or the other; the threats and
counterthreats at the Congress of Vienna,
at the bargaining table in labor disputes,
etc. These &dquo;moves,&dquo; &dquo;calculations,&dquo; and &dquo;de-
cisions&dquo; have no place in Richardson’s con-
ceptual scheme.
If, then, one maintains that it is such dis-
crete, discontinuous events which are of
crucial importance in political science,
rather than the sort of &dquo;causality&dquo; which is
described in physics by differential equa-
tions, one brings to bear a crucial critique
upon Richardson’s conceptual scheme. In a
way, the theory of games uses a conceptual
scheme much more conducive to taking de-
cisions, calculations of consequences, etc.,
into account, and one could well argue that,
if a rigorization and mathematization of po-
litical science is to take place, game theory
will prove a more useful intellectual tool
than the conceptual arsenal of mathematical
physics, on which Richardson has drawn.
But, of course, game theory is beset with
its own difficulties. Its theorems rest on a
definition of utility which has never received
sufficient empirical realization. It assumes
&dquo;complete omniscience&dquo; of the participants
with respect to all possible outcomes and
with respect to the valuation of all the out-
comes by all concerned and also &dquo;complete
rationality&dquo; of the participants with respect
to maximization of utilities under the con-
straints of the situation and many other im-
plausible conditions.
Of course such limitations are the lot of
any mathematical theory. The mathematical
theorist must pay by sacrificing realism for
what he gains in rigor and tractability of
reasoning. The mathematical theorist also
foregoes the privilege of asserting that some-
thing is &dquo;so.&dquo; All he can say is that, if some-
thing u;ere so, then something else would
necessarily have to be so. The &dquo;if&dquo; part is
always questionable, but the &dquo;then&dquo; part is
always a compelling consequence of the &dquo;if&dquo;
part.
The strength of the mathematical method
becomes apparent as soon as there are two
or more widely different models or concep-
tual schemes. For then there is hope of
eventually settling at least in part some
heretofore sterile debates conducted in the
metaphysical realm.
Is there historical determinism, or do
leaders and geniuses play a decisive role in
history? Tolstoi held to the first alternative,
and Carlyle to the second. Mathematics can-
not presume to treat this subject on such a
grandiose scale. But in a more modest set-
ting significant answers can be given. To
the extent that certain trends (most likely
including mass behavior, economic indexes,
regular ebbs and flows of attitudes) can be
described by equations of the kind used in
physics and chemistry, the first hypothesis
is corroborated. To the extent that single
acts and their valuations, strategies, counter-
strategies, choices, and decisions enter the
formal scheme in which the observed events
are deduced as consequences, more cre-
dence can be given to the type of hypothesis
of which Carlyle’s formulation is a poetic
expression.
Very likely both approaches are relevant
in different sectors of human affairs and
even in different aspects of the same sector.
We should not allow our emotional com-
mitments to disregard the possible impor-
tance of either.
